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Abstract:
The paper uses data on the volume outstanding of small business loans from the midyear Call reports to summarize the nature of small business lending at banks that were involved in mergers between June 1993 and June 1996. Then, a model of gradual adjustment by the consolidated bank following the merger is estimated to determine whether the portfolio share of small business loans at the consolidated bank tends to move over time towards either the pre-merger share at the acquiring bank or the typical share at other banks of roughly the same size as the consolidated bank.
In an era of rapid consolidation in the banking industry, the effect of mergers on the availability of credit to small businesses is a question that merits a great deal of scrutiny by researchers and policymakers. Depending on the general attitude of the acquiring institution, the current trend of consolidation in the banking industry could either boost or limit the volume of funds flowing towards small businesses. For instance, if acquiring institutions, on average, had more profitable investment opportunities than the small business loans of the banks that they acquired, then one could expect these assets to be run off by the new, merged institution.
On the other hand, it also seems plausible that a reasonable means for a bank to expand its portfolio of small business loans would be to purchase another bank that had a large volume of these loans and a staff that was skilled in monitoring them. Of course, one could imagine other attitudes of acquiring and acquired banks towards small business lending, but these two suffice to show that the net effect of consolidation on small business lending is ambiguous theoretically.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it summarizes the nature of small business lending at those banks involved in mergers between June 1993 and June 1996. This period was chosen because banks first were required to report the volume and number of business loans by the initial size of the loan in the midyear Call report beginning in 1993, and June 1996 is the most recent reading that is available.
The paper then reviews the major previous contributions in this area, examining critically the major assumptions embodied in their projections for the effect of consolidation on the level of small business lending. A facet of this last endeavor involves determining if actual patterns of lending following a merger correspond to those predicted by previous theoretical work.
Several definitions and assumptions that are employed throughout this paper are best addressed at the outset. First, banks with less than $250 million of assets are termed small banks, those with $250 million to $5 billion of assets are termed medium banks and those with more than $5 billion of assets are termed large banks.
Small business loans, which throughout this paper are the outstanding balances of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans that originally were in amounts of less than $1 million, are assumed to go to small businesses. The data for small business loans on the Call are reported by the initial size of the loan, not the size of the borrower. That is, the data reflect small loans to businesses rather than loans to small businesses. Treating all of the data as loans to small businesses, though a reasonable assumption that is supported by some empirical results, (especially for very small and very large loans (Scanlon 1981) ) likely introduces some error into the analysis.
The paper frequently contrasts characteristics of banks that purchased another bank with those of banks that were purchased.
Distinguishing the bank that acquires another from the bank that was acquired is a subtle problem that falls to the generators of banking statistics. The procedure that is employed is described extensively in the National Information Center Processing Instruction Guide. Speaking roughly, analysts follow a decision tree that first determines, if possible, which of the parties to a merger of banks had dominant management in the consolidated institution. If this rule fails, the analyst checks the charter type. At the next node on the decision tree, the successor is designated as the party that had the most sound financial condition before the merger, and then, the type of insurance held by the parties to the merger is considered. If the analyst is unable to designate the surviving bank according to any of these measures, then the largest party prior to the merger is deemed the successor bank.
The analysis is performed mainly at the bank level rather than at the bank holding company level. While good arguments also can be made for carrying out the analysis at the holding company level, the bank level seemed a bit more appropriate. The issue that determines which level of organization to examine is the degree of control that the holding company exerts on the allocation of its member's assets towards small business loans. If each member of a holding company has broad control over the allocation of its assets, then it seems that one should treat each member of the holding company as an individual decision maker. If, in contrast, the holding company controls tightly the asset allocation of its members, then treating each member that acquires another bank as a more or less identical miniature of the entire holding company would tend to overweight the decisions of the parent, the ultimate decision maker in this sort of business structure. A significant portion of the merger activity during the sample period involves intra-holding-company acquisitions which might also suffer from the same type of problem. The approach taken was to use the data at the bank level, but to recalculate at each point along the way the results with data aggregated to the highest bank holding company involved in any particular merger. Because most intra-holding company acquisitions occurred on a single day, and same-day acquisitions were aggregated for each acquirer in both data sets (as will be discussed more completely in the data section), the major characteristics of acquiring banks when viewed at the bank level are quite similar to the characteristics of acquiring institutions when the data that are aggregated to the holding company level. However, the regression results for the simple model that is developed in this paper change substantially when the data are aggregated to the highest holding company, as shall be discussed in the section on regression results.
Characteristics of banks involved in mergers Characteristics of banks involved in mergers
The upper panel of Table 1 shows that from mid 1993 to mid 1996 almost half of the number of purchases of small banks were by other small banks (655 of 1434). This observation perhaps is a bit surprising given the tone of the discourse in the popular press, which generally depicts large national and regional banks rapidly snatching up smaller banks. Furthermore, most of the remaining 2. Each member of a bank holding company is treated separately. The data include independent banks and individual members of a bank holding company. 3. Data for members of each acquiring bank holding company are aggregated to the highest holding company. The data for acquired institutions include independent banks and holding companies. 4. "Small" refers to loans that were originally less than $1 million. When data were aggregated by holding company, large banking organizations still accounted for many fewer mergers than either medium or small organizations.
The lower part of Table 1 shows that between mid 1993 and mid 1996, among banking institutions that were involved in mergers:
1) independent banks tended to be more aggressive lenders to small businesses than members of bank holding companies; 2) smaller banks generally were more aggressive small business lenders than larger banks; and 3) acquiring institutions tended to be more aggressive small business lenders than comparably-sized and comparably-structured acquired institutions. For example, small, independent, acquiring banks held 8.4 percent of their assets in small business loans, a full percentage point more than the 7.3 percent allocation at small banks independent banks that were acquired, and more than two percentage points more than the ratio at small bank holding companies that were acquired. Medium-sized, independent banks that acquired another institution were the most aggressive group of small business lenders in the sample, devoting 9.3 percent of their assets to small business loans, almost a percentage point more than independent, small, acquiring banks. During the sample period, large bank holding companies that acquired another bank had a median ratio of small loans to assets of 3.7 percent, which is considerably greater than the ratio at large banking institutions that were acquired during the period, but it is far below the median ratio of roughly 6 to 7 percent at small banks or bank holding companies that were acquired.
The main purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the claim that consolidation leads to reductions in small business lending by banks. Conceptually, such a reduction could come from two separate sources. First, if after a merger, large acquiring banks adjusted the proportion of assets at the new, consolidated bank back to a level comparable with that which prevailed before the purchase, then purchases of smaller banks by large banks could tend to lessen the volume of small business loans that flows through commercial banks. However, the pattern of acquisitions that was discussed earlier indicated that the bulk of purchases were by small and medium sized banks that held a relatively substantial amount of small business loans. Thus, it seems possible that, on average, the management of each consolidated bank tended to view small business loans as a more attractive investment than did the management of the bank that was acquired, suggesting that consolidation may have promoted small business lending. A second way that consolidation could lessen the flow of small business loans through banks would be if the small and medium-sized banks that accounted for most of the merger activity began to view small business loans less favorably as they grew through acquisitions.
Previous empirical work Previous empirical work
Abstracting considerably, previous empirical work, as exemplified by Peek and Rosengren (1995) and Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) generally notes a relationship similar to that shown in the upper panel of Figure 1 , which plots on the vertical scale the ratio to total assets of the dollar amount of commercial and industrial loans that were initially in amounts of less than $1 million (small C&I loans) against the size of the bank as measured by total assets on the horizontal scale. Although detail on the volume and number of small C&I loans has been reported on the June
Call reports since 1993, the figure shows data from the latest report (1996) . The plot indicates that large banks tend to devote a smaller share of their assets to small business loans than the highlights the wide range of lending practices regarding small C&I loans at small and medium institutions. For instance, many small banks make no small C&I loans, while many others devote more than 15 percent of their assets to such loans.
As a final indicator of the strength of the tendency for smaller banks to devote a larger share of assets to small business loans, a simple regression of the ratio on assets yields an estimate of the slope parameter that is highly significant--the absolute value of the t-ratio is about 10.
Previous studies generally tend to project the effect of consolidation on small C&I loans by assuming that the management of the new bank adjusts the ratio of small C&I lending to assets to match the ratio that prevailed at other banks that are roughly comparable to its new, larger size. As a result, consolidation implies less small business lending. It is assumed that the consolidated bank cannot immediately reallocate its assets; indeed, Strahan and Weston (1995) assert that complete adjustment requires at least two years. As a result, a partial adjustment model is adopted, where the true target ratio of small business loans to assets is unknown, but is assumed to be correlated with either the pre-merger allocation of the acquiring bank or the allocation of other banks of a size comparable to the consolidated bank. Letting AB represent the ratio of small C&I t loans to assets t days after an acquisition for consolidated bank AB (the result of bank A purchasing bank B), AB represents the initial ratio of small C&I loans to assets at 0 the composite bank, that is, the ratio is constructed by combining the preacquisition loans and assets of banks A and B at the instant that the banks merge. represents the average change in the ratio for banks of roughly the same size as the consolidated bank.
A is the ratio of small C&I loans to assets at the acquiring bank 0 measured before the acquisition, and represents the average change in the ratio of small loans to assets at banks of a size similar to that of A before the acquisition.
The intuition for this expression is straightforward. The consolidated bank is assumed to move over time towards one of two targets. Either the consolidated bank adjusts its ratio of small C&I loans to deposits to assets in a fashion similar to other banks in its size cohort, or it tends to move its ratio back towards its prepurchase level. In other words:
Change at Divergence Divergence consolidated = from mean or from pre-purchase bank for size group allocation .
Vertical movements are the primary focus of the model that was shown in figure 1 ; that is, changes in the assets of a bank are assumed largely to be separable from decisions regarding the allocation of the bank's assets. Certainly, bank AB also might dispose of some assets following the merger; however, the main concern is the allocation of the assets of the consolidated bank, not its choice of the level of assets. Even though the model used for this paper does not consider explicitly the joint choice of the level of assets at the consolidated bank and the allocation of assets towards small business loans, an additional variable, the rate of growth of assets relative to other banks, has been added to the equation.
A simple linear form is assumed so that:
Here the term represents the growth of assets at consolidated bank AB less the growth of assets at other banks of a similar size.
Assuming that the adjustment requires some time, and the set of mergers between 1993 and 1996 have vintages that range from almost two years to only a few days, it seems reasonable to allow the parameters to vary with time:
Here, the coefficients with subscripts reflect the typical divergence of the ratio of small C&I loans to assets at consolidated banks from either the ratio at other banks of a similar size or from their pre-purchase ratio. The time variable is the number of days between the purchase date and June 30 of the year in which readings on loans and assets were taken. The particular year in which the readings were taken differs depending on the maximum time of adjustment that is allowed for the each regression that follows, as shall be illustrated more fully in the estimation section that follows. The unsubscripted coefficients capture the consolidated bank's adjustment of small C&I loans and assets after the acquisition towards one of the two targets.
Substituting the third equation into the second, the equation suggests that the consolidated bank moves quickly back to its preacquisition allocation of assets towards small business loans, and the size and significance of 7 depends on the bank's adjustment over time. Finally, a positive value for 9 or 9 implies that the 0 consolidated bank tends to accumulate assets at a rate that is greater than other banks of a similar size.
A number of banks were involved in multiple acquisitions. For banks that purchased numerous others on the same day (for instance, one bank may have purchased numerous members of a bank holding company), all the acquired banks were artificially consolidated so that the transaction appears as one purchase by the acquiring bank.
For banks that purchased other banks on several different days, each transaction was entered separately, that is, the purchasing bank for the second transaction was taken to be the artificially constructed composite bank comprising the original purchaser and its first acquisition. Banks that purchased another bank, but subsequently were themselves purchased by another bank, were excluded from the sample.
Estimation Estimation Table 2 shows the variables included in equation 4 using the data on small loans from the mid-year Call reports for banks that were involved in mergers between mid 1993 and mid 1996. During this period, 1658 banks were acquired by another bank. As mentioned above, some of the banks in these observations purchased more than one bank during the sample period. Indeed, 933 of the transactions involved more than one purchase, 631 of these involved more than one purchase on a single day. Another 87 banks that bought another bank were themselves subsequently the target of an acquisition.
After consolidating the multiple purchases and excluding the purchasers who were, in turn, purchased, 1194 observations remained for the estimation. The mean of the dependent variable was 6 percent, suggesting that consolidated banks, on balance, expanded their concentration of small business loans following a merger. This tendency to increase the prevalence of small business loans was widespread among banks involved in mergers--only 25 percent of these institutions expanded their ratio of small business loans to assets by less than 3 percentage points during the months following the merger, while 25 percent increased this ratio by at least 8 percentage points.
In the initial regression, the data were recorded only for the first mid-year call report following a merger--that is, the time The parameter for the target associated with the acquiring bank's pre-purchase concentration of small C&I loans, , is positive and highly significant statistically, indicating a pronounced tendency for aggressive small business lenders to remain aggressive after the purchase of another bank.
The estimate of 7 was negative, though it was not significant statistically, which implies that little adjustment of the portfolio of small business loans occurs over time after a consolidation. growth of assets at banks that acquired another bank relative to other banks in their size cohort, were quite small and insignificant statistically. This result suggests that during the first year following a merger, the rate at which consolidated banks changed their assets relative to their cohorts had little effect on the consolidated bank's relative concentration of small business loans.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, several previous studies asserted that banks may take at least two years to adjust completely to an acquisition. Although some of the transactions that were in the previous dataset appear again here with a longer time of adjustment, all of the mergers from 1995-1996 were excluded. Also, more banks that acquired another bank but subsequently were themselves acquired had to be excluded--727 observations remained after these adjustments.
The major changes were to variables associated with the time variable. The summary statistics for the dependent variable and both the targets were little changed from the values when only one year or less of adjustment was allowed. The control for asset growth, , was significantly larger, but this undoubtedly reflected the steady accumulation of assets over a longer interval of time. Comparing Table 6 with Table 2 indicates the substantial changes that occur in the variables when the transactions of the acquirers are aggregated to the level of the highest holding company.
Values for the dependent variable and both targets plummeted to near zero, as aggregate assets and small business loans at the holding company level generally dwarfed the marginal contribution of any particular acquisition. For instance, the dependent variable, , was about zero when the data were aggregated to the level of the highest bank holding company--indicating that during the year following an acquisition there was a neglegible change in the share of small business loans to assets at the entire holding company. Similarly, both targets were more or less identical to the initial values immediately following a merger; that is, both and are near zero. Table 7 shows the parameters obtained by fitting equation 4 to only transactions by bank holding companies. As one might expect given the substantial changes in the dependent variable and both targets, compared with the estimates from the regression that included independent banks and the members of bank holding companies that acquired other banks (shown in Table 3 ), the parameter estimates changed substantially. As suggested in the previous paragraph, much of the change in the estimates likely came as data on assets and loans for individual members of the holding company were swamped by adding in corresponding data from the other members of the holding company as well as for the high holding company itself. 
Conclusions Conclusions
The data and analysis that were presented in this paper suggest that there are several reasons to discount the popular notion that consolidation in the banking sector leads to a constricted flow of credit to small businesses. First, although large banks do tend to devote a smaller share of their assets to small business loans than smaller banks, the main purchasers of small banks have themselves been quite small. Furthermore, the purchasers tend to be much more active small business lenders than either the banks that they purchased or comparably-sized banks that
were not involved in a merger. Finally, a regression analysis suggests that banks that acquired another bank largely tended to revert very quickly towards their original lending philosophy as indicated by their pre-merger allocation of assets towards small C&I loans. This behavior is contrary to the widespread notion that consolidation inevitably leads to less credit for small businesses.
These results should not be carried too far, however, because when loans and assets are aggregated across all members of bank holding companies, the model adopted in this paper does not fit very well. If one is interested in assessing the effect of consolidation on small business lending within bank holding companies, then a much richer model of the interactions of the holding company and its members is necessary.
